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WE COME AS FRIENDS:
The Social and Historical Context of
Nineteenth Century New Mexico

The central purpose of this work is to define several
of the broad contours of New Hexico's social history from
1810 to 1910.

This period was marked by radical social

change and by manifestations of deep social conflict.

An

explanation of the social context in which certain events
took place, illustrating change and conflict, will helo
clarify one chapter of New Mexico's intricate story.
The larger saga of nineteenth century New 1'1exico, yet
to be written, is about a people who struggled to live
honorably under difficult conditions.

Theirs was a society

not of consensus, but of conflict; important patterns and
themes in their lives derived from social upheaval and
disruption, from the imposition of an economic and political
system, and from ideological and religious questions.

As

their world changed, they acted as people everywhere have
acted when confronted with similar problems.

Their response

to change and conflict reflected a universal theme, for they
participated in the making of their own history.
During the first haTf of the nineteenth century, traders
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and merchants from the U.S. established

trade.

In a study of the .polit.ical economy .of the Southwest,
Raul Fernandez analyzed this gradual change as the
"beginning stage in the ultimate victory of one system
of production and land tenure over another. ,,l

By the

mid-1840s, a new era had emerged; the pr.ocess of economic
transition had been firmly established.

According to

Fernandez, this development was the "initial stage of the
antagonism between two socio-economic formations or modes
of production: a predominantly canitalist system and a
variant of feudalism." 2
Mexico's trade policies in the 1820s allowed entrepreneurs
from the U.S. to transport textiles, hardware and tools,
exchanging them for Mexican silver, blankets, hides and mules.
Hence, profitable trade was established not only in Santa Fe
and Chihuahua, but links to Durango, Sonora and California
were also created.

The effect of this economic development,

according to Fernandez, was disintegration of the Mexican
subsistence economy.

The increase in the commercial exchange

between the two unevenly developed areas did not encourage
establishment of local industries in the less developed area.
Of course, the process of changing the system of production
continued after the
the century.

of 1846, during the second half of

Eventually, capitalism dominated the social
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organization .of. production as the arr.ival .o£ railroads
stimulate·d cattle ·and mining indusitr.ie.s.

Fxe.ig.ht

transportation opened .new markets and intensive capitalistic
enterprises bec·ame a reality.

Those \vith capital or financial

support had advantages in the competition for economic
control because; by the 'late nineteenth century, a currencybased system had been established and corporative interests
dominated the economy.

This marked the final stage of the

defeat of a variant of feudalism by capitalism.

During this

latter period of rapid flux and upheaval, legal and extralegal
means of coercion and an accompanying ideology were employed
to gain control of the ·land and its resources.

Life and

death struggles ensued.
The wholes·ale transfer of land ownership and control
from Me:Xicano communities to Anglo dominated corporations
played a central part in the victory of capitalism.

And the

rule of law, as instrument and as ideology, became important
in the ·transformation.

The rupture began when the so-called

Army of the West invaded New Mexico in the summer of 1846.
Even though the U.S. was at war with Mexico, the U.S.
commanding officer told the people that their civil,
political, property, and religious rights would be protected.
"You are now American citizens," he said, "subject only to
the laws of the U.S.

1tJE COME AS FRIENDS and in our government

all men are created equal."

He called upon the people to
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"exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord,
and in maintaining the authority and efficiency of the laws."
But in an unequal society in which private property was sacred,
equality before the law would be rendered impossible.
The strategy in gaining control of New Mexico called
for limited use of military force.

Attempts would be made

to persuade a majority of the people that it would be in their
best interest not to resist, but to pledge loyalty to the new
regime.

To persuade the people, the rule of law was introduced

as evidently impartial and just, and to function as ideology,
as mediator of class relations, the law had to demonstrate a
certain distance from direct intervention.

The law could

not be openly abused, because then it could not disguise
unequal relations.

Nevertheless, the new ruling class,

collaborating with powerful Mexican families, legally defined
property rights in accordance with their particular interests.
Domination was the primary goal in these changing power
.
h"1ps. 3
re 1 at1ons

In the second half of the nineteenth century, New Mexico
was a society of conflict, not of consensus; accordingly, the
law was used directly as an instrument of class power, but
within limits, so as not to arouse deep dissatisfaction which
could develop into sustained mass orotest.

Those limits were

circumscribed so that the law, hypothetically, could be used
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by poor people, but even then, only infrequently.

The

ruling class would "present itself as the guardian of the
interests and sentiments of those being ruled."

To

establish and maintain hegemony those in control had to
reconcile popular ideas of justice with absolute claims of
property. 4
Interrelationships between property and the law and
between consensus, coercion, and ideology constituted the
basis of the central historical problems of nineteenth century
New Mexico.

Controlling interests placed

value upon

property, using the law to justify actions motivated by an
amalgam of those values.

Moreover, in nineteenth century

North America, men of property presumed they were free from
political and moral restraints.

These "robber barons" and

"captains of industry" took great ideological pains to explain
that God and Nature had sanctioned the unfettered accumulation
of land. 5
The men in power applied discretionary rules, but always
used the law as an instrument of authority.

In doing so, they

molded social consciousness, thereby consolidating and
maintaining their domination.

Their goal was to persuade by

subtle means or to coerce by crude measures, frequently
alternating discretion and force, the many to submit to the
few.

For as one historian wrote: "'Hegemony' implies class

antagonisms; it also implies the ability of the ruling class
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to contain those antagonisms on a terrain in which its
legitimacy is not dangerously questioned." 6
In nineteenth century New Mexico, intricate and ingenious
legal procedures and technicalities, employed judiciously by
those who possessed "superior knowledge" of the law,
contributed toward the transfer of property ownershio.

But

when the law could not be used as instrument, or as ideology,
coercion was employed.

Knowledge of federal land laws such as

the Donation Act (1854), the Homestead Act (1862), the Timber
Culture Law (1873), and the Desert Land Act (1877) permitted
surveyors-general, other public officials including several
governors, the so-called Santa Fe ·Ring, and less important
rings to gain possession of vast amounts of land.

Abuses of

the law included perjury, forgery, and false pretense.

But

the law was not desecrated to the extent that it lost its
value to the ruling class.

If the law had functioned

partially and unjustly all of the time, it could not have
masked, disguised or legitimated class hegemony.

The object

was to present the law as being independent from gross
manipulation.

When it became clear to many people--including

some from the ruling class--that the law was being unduly
abused, reformers responded by investigating fraud and by
unimportant procedural aspects of the law, yet
arguing for continued deification of the law and for the sacred
right to property. 7

7

Conflict hefore the-War
1846
- -of
-Before the large-scale transfer of land ownership and
before the rule of law became firmly established, several
conflicts set the stage for oatterns which later became tightly
woven.

Pedro Pino from Santa Fe analyzed conditions in a

report submitted to the Spanish Cortes in 1810.

Two years

later, the report, Exposici6n Sucinta y Sencilla de la
Provincia del Nuevo Mexico, was published; it contained the
most valuable information available on New Mexico just prior
to the arrival of North Americans. 8
Pino fores·aw conflict between New Mexico and North
America, citing as evidence Lieutenant Zebulon Pike's secret
mission of 1806.

When Bartolome Fernandez arrested Pike's

party on the west bank of the Rio del Norte in northern
New Mexico, Pike insisted he was lost; but his presence
was disquieting to officials.

As one writer noted, Pike's

mission forecast the war of conquest which took place forty
years later. 9
Treated more like a guest than a prisoner, Pike recorded
his observations while traveling from Santa 'Fe to Mexico City.
In 1810,·

a journal of his sojourn, was published.

It provided valuable information for North American traders who
began entering New Mexico in greater numbers after the United
States acquired the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803.
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Later, in 1821, £ormal trade
Mexico were executed.

between the U.S. and

Mexican o.fficials agr.eed to establish

trade ·with Missouri merchants, but they had no intention of
losing control of New Mexico, the northernmost province or
department.
By the second quarter of the nineteenth ·century, however,
traders and merchants were participating in the economic and
political life ·of the province.

New settlers included Charles

Beaubien, Ceran St. Vrain, both French-Canadians, Kit Carson
and the Bent brothers; later this group, forming a fifth
column, would support the U.S. military occupation.

According

to historian Howard Roberts Lamar: "They were the spearheads
of the American invasion of New Mexico." 10 Antonio Jose
Martinez from Taos referred to them as the "American Party,"
and in a report to Mexican president Antonio Lopez de Santa
Anna, Martinez recounted their powerful economic and political
influence. 11
Consequently, conflicts arose as Americans pressured
Mexican officials for grants of land.

As Lamar wrote: "In

Taos, where no less than fifteen grants had been made in six
years, the issue caused a deep split between the ''American
Party' ... and the Martinez family and their allies."

Because

"a friendly justice of the peace, prefect or governor meant
the difference ·between a confirmed grant and a rejected one,"
intense campaigns for political control were waged and violence
erupted frequently. 12

9

A popular .revolt in 1837 against Go:ver.nor Albino Perez's
policies increased the tension between extranjeros and
nativos. 13 When opposition forces, comprised of Mexicans
and Indians, occupied the capital on August 9, the political
crisis climaxe·d. But, according to Philip Reno, "No outrage
d upon Am erlcans.
•
nl4 One
.
.
o£ any lmportance
was commltte
American, howeVer, reported that some Mexicans had called for
death to the '"Americanos and gringos. ulS

\\fhat Americans feared

most was confiscation of their goods; hence, they supported
the wealthy Mexican families who protected their economic
interests.

"Any relations the Anglo-Americans had were with

Governor Manuel Armijo rather than with the rebels, and their
attitude toward the Gonzales government is shown by their
cooperation in overthrowing it." 16 Armijo, of the ruling
class, led the counter forces against the ·popular takeover
captained by Jose Gonzales.
Antonio Bustamante, secretary to a Mexican general,
"told the American Consul in September 1837 that the government
felt confident that Americans had taken no part in the recent
upheaval in New Mexico but a 'different opinion prevailed among
the mass of the people, who attributed all popular commotions
occurring in the northern states' to the scheming Americans." 17
El Tm];>ai''c·i·al said that "Violence in New Mexico was caused by
Americans who conquered by sponsoring such ·uprisings." 18 Of
course,' Mexicans had not forgotten that in 1836 Texans had
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seceded from the Republic after

Santa Anna•s

forces in a battle ·at San Jacfnto.
In 1841, the Lone 'Star Republic ·serit an expedition to New
Mexico, straining relations between extranjeros and nativos
to the

point.

The Texans sought to extend political

control over New Mexico territory east of the· Rio Bravo.

This

was an audacious move ·since the area contained half of New Mexico,
including Santa Fe and other old settlements established in
the first ·decade of the severiteerith century.

The Texans argued

that Article 3 of the 1836 Treaty of Velasco, which Santa
Anna was forced to sign, guaranteed them all lands north and
east of the Rio Bravo.

The Mexican Congres·s had not ratified

the Treaty and some ·political leaders disagreed vehemently with
the Texans' illogical argument.
Ostensibly, one ·of the primary motives for dispatching ·
the expedition was to establish commercial
Fe merchants.

ties with Santa

"If the purpose of the expedition was to establish

commercial relations," Charles HcClure wrote, "it is interesting
to note the emphasis placed on the ·seriding of troops, not
merchants." 19 It was true, however, that Texas was bankrupt.
William Dryden, a Texas trader and advance agent, shed
light ·on the ·Texans' motives wheri he reported that every
American in New Mexico would support the overthrow of the
government.

Evidently motivated by self-interest, Dryden also

reported that two-thirds of all the Mexicans and all of the
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Pueb.lo Indians were with Texas "heart and

Indeed,

there ·was fear·, as McClure wrote, "that many Mexicans were
sympathetic to Texan and American schemes of annexation.

But

while ·there was some discontent on the ·part of a few New Mexicans
it was not as great as Dryderi reported."

He angered

Mexicans wheri he ·circulated propaganda citing the advantages
of Texas-style '"freedom and democr·acy."

Dryden became even

more ·controversial when he accused Mexican officials of malfeasance
in an investigation following the murder of a fellow American. 20
Historian Gene Brack wrote that the ·expedition had not
surprised Mexicans, since they had suspected for some time
that Americans wanted control of Mexico's northern provinces.
General Jose Urrea, for e;xample ,· believed Americans and Texans
(who were the same to him) were sympathetic to their fellow
Americans in New Mexico and California.

Indeed, Mexicans

perceived Texas secession as thinly disguised American
aggression, and the Expedition of 1841 confirmed to them that
Anglo-Americans were now conspiring to take over New Mexico;
hence, there ·was hostile opposition to Texas and U.S. policies. 21
In New Mexico rumors spread that Americans were in
sympathy with the Texas cause; therefore, Governor Manuel
Armijo issued a proclamation: "Foreigners who are naturalized
citizens have the same obligation as Mexicans of natural birth";
to fight against the ·invaders.

Foreigners not naturalized

were ·ordered to observe ·complete ·netitrali·ty.

Tension increased
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. o
. f t h e. expe
. d" .
as news

sprea d . 2 2

Juan Vigil from ·Taos :accused Thomas Rowiand, William
Workman and Charles· Berit of

with Tejanos.

Soon

after, Rowland accused Vigil and others of stealing his
property.

Rowland, a seven year resident of New Mexico, then

proceeded to beat Vigil with a whip.

Berit wi tnes·sed the

beating; and although 'he was arres.ted as an accomplice, he
bribed officials, theieby avoiding a jail

After

being accused of conspiracy, Workman and Rowland "thinking
it prudent to depart, led a well known
Califo.rnia." 23

party to

Josiah Gregg conn:nented that the most "glaring outrages"
committed against American citizens took place in 1841; intense
anti-Ametican feelings endangered American lives, he wrote.
Consequently, Ame·ricans demanded that Manuel Alvarez, a Spaniard
as U.S. Consul in Santa Fe, ask Governor Armijo for
protection.

Armijo agreed to do so if the Americans refrained

from supporting the ·Texans.

The govetnor was mistrustful, however,

because as the expedition floundered across the llano estacada,
two' members deserted, arriving in Santa Fe ahead of the others
and naming several extranjeros as Texas spies.
On 16 September, Armijo rode towards Las
the Texas "rag-tag" army.

to meet

Simultaneously, several Mexicans

entered Alvarez's house questioning his alliance with the
foreigners.

According to Gregg, "A fellow named Martin, his
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nephew and confidential

aided by a band .of ferocious

·s·ans· ·cu1'a:t·t·es, and armed with a
the house ·of the Consul."

kn.ife; secretly entered

The Consul, he wrote, "received a

severe 'blow ·to the ·head, and instead of being punished

the

diabolical act the ·principal assassin was soon promoted in
the army."

Others also opposed to Alvarez's actions shouted:

.saquenlo afuera!
I

.matenlo!

I

aide, dispersed the group

But Guadalupe Miranda, Armijo's

thus saving the ·consul's life.

Two

days before, Alvarez had "demanded that foreigners in New l1exico
be treated as netitrals .... " 24
Alvarez again antagonized Mexican officials when he
demanded the release ·of George Wilkins Kendall, a journalist
who had accompanied the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition.

Alvarez

argued that since Kendall was an American, he should be released.
The ·strategy called for using Antonio Navarro, a Mexican with
the expedition who had also been captured.

Charles Bent, James

Wiley Magoffin and Alvarez asked for Navarro's release "to
shew

that we were not altogether partial to the Americans."

Howeve-r, Governor Armijo refused to free theni, and Kendall
and Navarro were forced to march to Mexico City with the other
.
. 25
pr1soners.

Kendall later wrote Nart'ati\ies of' the· Tex·as·-"Santa· Fe
· Exp·edi·t·ion, exhibiting "the well-known Anglo preJudice against
New Mexicans."

The reporter had been captured by Captain
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Damasio Salazar near Anton Chico, and, no doubt, that
humiliating experience fueled his racial attitude.

Salazar

had ordered that Kendall and four members of an advance party
be shot as spies and trespassers: "Had not Gregorio Vigil
interceded and argued that only Governor Armijo had
authority to execute prisoners, all five most certainly would
have been shot."

Kendall said Salazar was a "most ignorant

man, unable to read or write."

According to McClure, however,

"Salazar wrote complete reports to Armijo."

Kendall's

experience had not been pleasant; hence, his one-sided
personal account may have been an attempt to even the score. 26
On the other hand, Los Tejanos, a play written sometime
between 1841 and 1846, kept the memory of the expedition alive
among Mexicanos.

In the play, Navarro is a character portrayed

as a soldier in the Texas army, a traitor to Mexico.

At the

end of the play, one of the characters turns to a Tejano and
says, "You insolent Texans, how dare you profane the territory
of the Mexicans." 27
The Tejanos returned to Texas after their release from a
Mexico City jail, planning retaliation against the alleged
treachery of Armijo and Salazar.

Authorized by Lone Star

officials to steal from Mexicans who traveled through Texas on
trading journeys, Jacob Snively's band of thieves "killed and
robbed a prominent Mexican merchant and attacked militiamen
on the Cimarron cut-off of the Santa Fe trail.

When the shooting

15
was over, twenty-three Mexicans, many from Taos, lay dead."
In 1843 other Tejano bandits led by A. Warfield pillaged the
northern town of Mora, killing several persons and stealing
horses. 28
In the aftermath of the expedition, Mexican newspaper editors
feared that war with the U.S. was imminent, not distinguishing
between Texas and U.S. actions.

The attempt to conquer Santa

Fe had been expected; yet it was viewed as a concrete example
of aggression.

Some Mexicans believed it would better "to

be furied under the shattered remains of the nation than to
surrender to insolent pretensions of perverse neighbors."
Five years after the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition, Mexicans had
their chance when the U.S. declared war on Mexico. 29

s·oclal Pro·test· ln Northern New Mexico

The commanding officer of the United States Army of the
West proclaimed to the Mexican people in August 1846 that
the U.S. had taken possession of New Mexico and that henceforth
it would be under U.S. rule.

"We come as friends," he said,

"however, those of you who take up arms or encourage resistance
will be treated as enemies."

Since no outbreak of resistance

took place immediately, Stephen Kearny, the commanding officer,
left for California,

to the Secretary of War that

New Mexico had been conquered "without firing a single shot
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or spilling a

drop of bloo.d."

the U.S. Army repres.sed a mass

Five months later, however)
causing a blood bath. 30

One ·month before violent popular protest reached a climax,
Colonel Sterling Price,' then

Army coi:nmander, discovered

that Mexican ruling class families were 'planning opposition to
U.S. occupation.

Evidently, the ·aim of the· ·scheme was forceful

submiss·ion .of the newly instituted regime.

But before the

.strategy could be implemented, Col. Price ·intervened, arresting
.several of
Not long afterward, on 19 January 1847,· collective
violence erupted in Taos.

Charles· Bent, a merchant who had

been appointed governor by Kearny just five months before, and
others, including MeXicans who had declared allegiance to the
newly imposed authority, were killed.

In nearby Arroyo Hondo

protestors attacked a whiskey distillery and general store
owned by Simeon Turley, originally from Old Franklin, Missouri.
Turley and others barricaded inside were 'killed and the
building destroyed.

As the protest spread, several Americanos

were killed in Mora, southeast of Taos, across the Sangre de
Cristo Mountains.

U.S. troops retaliated, killing 25 I?ersons,

capturing seventeen prisoners, razing several homes and buildings,
and destroying fields nf crops.
Word of the

reached Col. Price in Santa Fe, and

he ·left immediately towards Taos with 500 'troops and four
howitzers.

At Santa Cruz, 25 miles· north of Santa Fe where
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opposition forces had gathered, a battle took place.

Price

reported that two U.S. soldiers had been killed and seven
wounded; he also reported that 36 "rebels" had been killed and
45 taken prisoner.

As the sides maneuvered for strategic

position, another short battle took place at Embudo, between
Santa Cruz and Taos.

Finally, on 3 February, Price and his

troops arrived in Taos, finding several hundred armed Mexicans
and Indians in a defensive position inside the Pueblo church.
After a prolonged attack on the church, U.S. troops stormed
inside and hand-to-hand combat ensued.

Price reported that

of the six or seven hundred Mexicans and Indians, 150 had been
killed.

Seven Americans were also killed and 45 wounded, most
of the wounded dying later, including Captain
Burgwin. 31
After the battles, some of the participants were arrested
and tried for treason and murder.

Several were hanged..

By

the spring of 1847, intense fighting had subsided; still
sporadic violent confrontations took place during the summer
months in Red River Canyon, in Las Vegas, in Anton Chico, and
in La Cienega.
Who participated in the violent social protest in
northern New Mexico?

Contemporary accounts are not helpful

in answering this question.

Neither are secondary interpretations.

Not surprisingly, U.S. military reports and stories told
by contemporaries, who were not friends of the protestors,
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created a stereotype, thereby leaving no face on the
protestors.

Without discriminating, their enemies labeled

them "rabble," "mob," "undesirable ruffians," "assassins,"
"bloodthirsty cowards," "criminal elements," and, consequently,
left them without an identity.

As George Rude explained

in another context, they became "a disembodied abstraction
and not an aggregate of men and women of flesh and blood." 32
In his study of popular disturbances in France and England
between 1740 and 1848, Rude observed that another approach,
rooted in the liberal tradition, has also been utilized to
describe "pre-industrial" protestors.

In this view, the

participants also lose their identity and become stereotyped,
variously described as "working class," as "the people," as
"patriots," or as "freedom fighters."

These vague labels,

which are extensions of particular motives or interests, are
not useful in describing the participants; yet they do reveal
the views of writers and observers who use such inadequate
generalizations.
The following subjective descriptions by contemporaries,
for example, reveal their particular attitudes.

A friend of

Bent, Dick Wooton, living in the Taos area in 1847, said that
on the morning of the 19th, the Americans (numbering less than
15 at the time) woke up to find Taos surrounded by "as
merciless a band of savages as ever went on the warpath."

The
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•'butchers," he ·said, theri proceeded to Arroyo Hondo to
"massac.re ·innocent souls. " 33 . And, in an account of the
Turley distillery fight, George Ruxton, .reportedly an
eyewitness,· referred to participants as "barbarous and cowardly
assailants."

One man was called an "inhuman wretch" by Ruxton

because apparently the man refused to help Turley escape
death.-3 4 Other observers commented that on the eve of the
attack, the protestors had "drank themselves to a frenzy."
Evidently, if one were to believe this account, alcohol led
to the "irrational behavior."

Donaciano Vigil, of the Mexican ruling class who assumed
command after Bent's death, blamed the "lower order of
Mexicans" for Berit's demise.

In an official report to U.S.

authoritie.s, Governor Vigil wrote that a "gang" composed of
"scoundrels," "desperadoes," and "vagabonds,"
war against "honest and discreet men." 35

had declared

Secondary interpretations do not tell us much more about
the participants' identity.

One writer, for example, said that

"treacherous men," "insurrectionists," and "murderous bands "
had been responsible for creating the "irrational disturbances." 36
Ralph Emerson Twitchell, nineteenth century compiler of
information, .referred to the participants as "the enemy ., as
"insurrectionists," as "rabble,,'" and as "revolutionists."
In his introduction to· The· His·t·ory· ·of· the· Mill.tary oc·cupa.tion
·at· N·ew Mexico, published in 1909, Twitchell left no doubt that
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his main purpo.se was not to write 'his t·ory, btit to glorify
the '"deeds of meri who won· the Wes·t, men whose courage,'
devotion to country and true citizenship enabled them to
accomplish the ·greatest military achievement of modern times .... "
Although 'Twitchell spuriously said he ·made "no special
pretense as an historical writer," his unbalanced interpretation
has influenced uncritical writers and students of New Mexico
history.

The courageous acts of the U.S. Army, he wrote,·

"should appeal to every loyal American and should find
portrayal in every school house throughout the land, thereby
inspiring and instilling the lessons of patriotism, honor,
valor, and love ·of country."

Twitchell dabbled not only in

historical writing, but in politics as well.

As a petty

functionary in the Republican Party, he was frequently a
confidante of Thomas Benton Catron, political boss and Santa
Fe ·ring leader.

The paisanos and small farmers who participated

in the ·protests could not have fared well in Twitchell's
"history." 37
More recently Warren A. Beck, author of New Mexico: A
Hist'ory' of· Four· Centuries, described the participants in the
protests as "ignorant natives."
.

.

.

a stan dar d text .

This book, now in its fourth
courses on New M

.

h.

38

Although ·Angelico Chavez's description of the participants
and his judgment of their behavior is similar to those mentioned,
he contributed what is perhaps the least ·tenable comparison
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of all.

,

Bent and the others, according to ChaYez, were

"cruelly massacred by a rebel mob of Mexicans and Indians." 39
What happened beginning in December 1846, Chavez explains,
"reminds one

of the modern young terrorists throughout

the world today ... a cabal of hot-headed younger caballeros with
their humbler followers hatched a plot to kill all the
Americanos as well as the native leaders who were collaborating
with theni. " 40 .
On another occasion, Chavez said that "New Mexico's people
had quickly accepted the Anglo-American intrusion .... True,
a few Hispanos plotted a rebellion, but this fizzled out and
the plotters were pardoned by an American court for having
acted as 'patriots' and no mere rebels." 41
For many years now, Chavez has been cast in the role of
apologist, constantly trapped in a swarm of logical inconsistencies
and contradictions.

His interpretation of the Uprising is an

example of his intellectual contribution to the preservation
of illusions which some "Spanish-Americans" have fervently
guarded, perhaps to soothe the pain which is inherent in the ·
experience of conquered people.
Indeed, most of New Mexico's storytellers have been plagued
by what David H. Fischer calls the "pragmatic fallacy."

That

is, they have distorted events to fit subjective, inappropriate
assumptions, which, in turn, bolster their cause.

Whether

conservative ·(.and most writers on New Mexico have been
conservative) or liberal (with one ·or two· exceptions none have
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veered from these .perspecti:ves), those who ha:ve written about
New MeXico usually have e·xcluded obJective descriptions of
the people ·who res.isted the imposition of exploitative U.S.
institutions. ·Perhaps these ahistorical interpretations have
been

particular interests, but they do
42
not help to clarify New Mexico's past.
The question remains: Who were 'the protestors?

Perhaps

some of them were, indeed, "assassins," "rogues," "s·anscullottes,

or "patriots," but imprecise categories like

thes·e remove ·people from their social and historical context,
characterizing them not as human beings, but as objects.
Simply, of the Mexicanos who protested, living in preindustrial times, most were small landowners, heirs to community
land grants, farmers who had always lived in the same place,
people ·with a close attachment to the land and its resources.
They were not in human bondage, inextricably bound to a few
rices or patrones, nor were they indebted to the newcomers,
the extranjeros.

They were, in fact, relatively free.

As one

Nuevo Mexicano said shortly before his death several years ago:
"Yo creo que la gente que peleo en esos tiempos era gente pobre,
rancheros que sembraban, que tenian su ganado, sus vacas y
gallinas, y que usaban la floresta y las mercedes para
mantenerse.

La gente habia vivido en sus propias casas y terrenos

por mucho tierripo.

No serian santos, pero tampoco fueron salvajes
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o gerite mala--en fin, eran ser humano-s, de ·carne ·y hueso, que
se ·deferidieron como pudieron."

The man, Manuel Romero y

Atencio, who', as his ancestors, lived on the ·east side of the
Sangre de ·cristos, believed that the people ·who fought were
poor; yet they owned land, a few animals, and survived
very we'll.

They were ·people closely attached to their homes,

mostly self-suffici.erit.

The people, he ·said, then as now,

were probably not saints, but neither were they inherently
evil or savage.

They were, simply, like other people, of

flesh and bone, who, at that moment, believed they had to
protect and defend their homes and interests, and they did it
the best way

knew how.

As far as I know, hermano Manuel

concluded, people ·have ·always done this.
What motivated the participants?
people to protest?
easily.

Is that so unusual?

LJ-3

What moved the "connnon"

This complex question will not be resolved

We have ·yet to formulate questions which would be

helpful in explaining actions of the "inarticulate participants."
Contemporary accounts were written by the protestors' enemies;
therefore, as might be expected, their versions were distorted.
And most explanations since then have been based on prejudicial
assumptions and on particular interests.

Writers' support of

the controlling class shaped their research and writing; hence
their interpretations have been attempts to justify actions
motivated by those class interests.·
But it can be ·demonstrated that the ·participants and their
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leaders acted r.ationally to redress social. grievances as they
perceived them, destroyi'!lg enemies: and prope.rty when appropriate,
thereby alleviating the 'immediate ·problem.

Furthermore,

interrelated motives·, not single ·reasons as some ·writers have
argued, contributed to ·social protes·t.

Ultimately, the

protestors defended their interests much like ·people have done
throughout history, particularly during times of disruption and
deep conflict.
Over a decade after the U.S.-Mexico War the ·coals of
conflict were stoked once again; this time ·the ·civil War acted
as catalyst.

The Confederate plan was to take control of New

Uexico for its strategic value.

The Union also believed the

area was key in the entire war effort.

Neither side could win

without ·the support of the Mexican people,· but because
Confederate troops were Texan, most of the Mexicanos declared
in favor of the Union.
"During the War," according to a recent study, "the Hispanos
provided both manpower and supplies to the Northern war
effort, but initially Union officials voiced conflicting
opinions concerning their loyalty and military efficiency. 1144
Colonel Edward R.S. Canby, in command of the Military
Department of New MeXico, viewed Mexicanos as apathetic,
doubting their military competency.

Although ·plans were ·to

use ·Mexicans as auxiliary troops, Canby believed they.would be
unreliable.·

Just before the battle at Valverde in southern
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New Mexico, _Canby repo.rted that l1exicans had

affection

for the institutions· of. the U.S> and, indeed, _eXhibited hatred
for all Americans."

"Lower class·" Mexicans were ·suspected

of plotting against the ·existing government, and a military
officer reported that Mexicans would "eventually rise and
cut all white ·meri's throats." 45
By February 1862, however, nearly 2,800 Mexicans had
volunte·ered to fight for the Union.

Some Mexicans from the

patron group volunte·ered to fight with the Union, demonstrating
their patriotism.

Others, however, saw the ·civil War as an

extension of the conflict with Texas: "The Civil War was never
mentioned as -such among the natives· of New Mexico.

It was,
instead, more connnonly called the war against the Texans." 46

For, according to M.A. Otero, Mexicanos "still remembered acts
of actrocity by Texans which had occurred twenty years before,
and mothers would often warn young children to behave or else the
Tejanos would come to carry them away."

Gove.rnor Henry Connelly

exploited the bitterness against Texans by emphasizing that
Mexicans ought to fight in defense ·of their territory against
.
.
.
47
t h e. .secon d Texas
1nvas1on.

After the ·civil War, people ·from the

·u.s.

entered New

Mexico in greater numbers, engaging Mexicanos in life and death
social
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Violent Social Conflict in the late Nineteenth Century
Collective violence became a fact of life by the
last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Of

violence

was not unique to New t1exico; rather, it was an integral
part of U.S. nineteenth century

At least four

major forms of violent social conflict were evident in
New Mexico during the past century:

popular protest,

political assassination, racial hostilty, and vigilante
activity.

The Uprising in Taos and the activities of Las

Gorras Blancas (the White Caps) and their allies in San
Miguel County manifested widespread social protest.

The

assassination of a Santa Fe political leader, one in a
series of politically motivated murders, dramatically
illustrated the struggle for control and oower.

And battles in

Lincoln County, vigilante lynchings and related unsolved murders
in Colfax and Socorro counties revealed deep racial strife. 49
White cap activity was an important source of protest.
An organization of small farmers, mostly land grant heirs, the
White Caps fought against land encroachment and against
corporations in the 1890s, a fluid and unstable decade. 50
Another pattern, political violence, became endemic in
the last quarter of the century.

Francisco Chavez was ambushed

in 1892, but his murder was only the most sensational.

He

was a Santa Fe nolitical leader, a member of the White Caps,
the Knights of Labor and a powerful opponent of Thomas Catron
and the Santa Fe ring.

Four Mexicanos, pawns in complex
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machinations-, .evidently
were hired to .murder
Chavez; five years
.
.
later the.se ·meri we.re ·eXecuted.

Although not proven in a court

of law that powerful political group·s ,· :which included bosses
like Catron, had planned Chavez's murder, the people who opposed
these· ·reactionary cliques believed there had been a conspiracy
to eiiminate the· ·strong leader·. 51
Racial hostility wove a pattern in the late 1870s, during
Anglo-American expansion into newly created Lincoln County,
Mexicanos battling Tejano "outlaw ·gangs" and cattlemen for land
and water.

Many Mexicans died in the struggles during the

chaotic settlement of the southeastern region, including a
young leader Juan Patron. 52
Racial conflict also intensified in the northeastern region
in the ·last quarter of the century.

Mexicano

,_

fought to live on land they had occupied for generations before
people from the

·u.s.

began arriving after the Civil War.

Struggles raged for control of the extensive ·Maxwell Land Grant,
vigilante activity periodically surfacing and Mexicanos frequently
caught in the middle. 53
Vigilantes also organized in Socorro in the Rio Abajo
area in 1880.

Three ·brothers of a Baca family fled to El Paso,

Texas, after being accused of murdering a newspaper editor, A.M.
Conklin, vigilantes demanding that the brothers hang.

Eventually,

one brother died in a shoot-out; a second brother was hanged
by vigilantes·; and the third. left 'Socorro after acquittal by
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a Mexican jury.

This

which was solidly entrenched

in the ·violent· traditions of the

greatly. exacerbated
relations ·between Anglos and Mexicans. 54
Additionally, so-called law and order leagues (like the
Knights of Liberty and various Button Gangs), "bandit societies,"
Uike ·ra Gavilla de ·silva),

gangs, and personal

vendettas dotted New Mexico's landscape.

In 1894, Governor

William Thornton expressed frustration because several racial
and political murders in various parts of the Territory
remained unso·lved.
Besides the "mysterious" murders, others like the OteroWhitney shoot-out demonstrated widespread discord.

Manuel

B. Otero, the only son of wealthy landowner Miguel Antonio
Otero and son-in-law of Antonio Jose Luna, powerful patron
from Valencia County, was shot and killed in 1883.

A gun

battle between Otero and J.G. Whitney, brother of Bostonian
Joel P. Whitney, president of the Silver

City Deming and

Pacific Railroad, stemmed from a fight for control of the
Estancia Land Grant.

J. Francisco Chaves, powerful politician

for fo.rty years, interviewed by the Albuque·rque· Mo'rning
· ·J·ourn·al, explained the Otero-Whitney legal entanglement.
Ironically, Chaves himself was mysteriously killed twenty
years later in the ·same general area.
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Other Dimensions of Social Change and Conflict
Social change and conflict in New Mexico signaled the
appearance of questions beyond economics and politics, although
all were intertwined.

As R.L. Duffus wrote: "The sentiment

represented by Native Americanism, Know-Nothingism and in
the later days by the A.P.A. and the Ku Klux Klan was often
carried across the plains with the caravans .... "

Of interest

here is the relationship between Anglo-Saxonism, anti. .
.
. 1 1st1c
. . expans1on1sm.
. .
55
ca tho 1 1c1sm
an d 1mper1a
Anti-Catholicism and Anglo-Saxonism, interrelated traditions
and doctrines discernible in mid-nineteenth century America,
were, of course, transplanted into New Mexico.

Reginald

Horsman in a recently published study, Race ·and Manifest
· ne·stiny, wrote that by mid-nineteenth century, during the
era of the U.S. -Mexico

rhetoric in the U.S. emphasized

that American Anglo-Saxons were a "separate, innately superior
people who were destined to bring good government, commercial
prosperity and Christianity to the American continents and
the world."

The "American Anglo-Saxon race" was superior to

all others, and inferior races were doomed to subordination
or extinction.

According to Horsman, these rampant Caucasian,
56
fl uor1s
. h e d 1n
. n1ne
. t eenth century Am er1ca.
.
.
Aryan d octr1nes
John Higham, in an earlier study, wrote that by
mid-nineteenth century, the Anglo-Saxon tradition had become
a reactionary slogan, constituting. "one of the manifold
ironies of intellectual history." 57
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Nor did
bother Anglo-Saxons .·

inconsistencies and contradictions
As ''chosen people" they produced

"abundant empirical proof" that they were, in fact, chosen
by God.

Intellectuals provided "sc·ientific theories" based

on the ·succes·s, inevitable it seemed, of Puritan settlements,
the triumph of liberal republicanism, extensive material
prosperity, and rapid territorial expansion.

Research

by Anglo-Saxon scholars proved beyond any reasonable doubt
that Anglo-Saxons were descendants of those Aryans who had
"carried civilization to the entire 'tvorld."

America's racial

theorists were an integral part of society, not lunatics
on the fringe, and their new racial ideo'logy was used to
justify "exploitation and suffering of blacks, Indians and
.Mexicans. ,SB
"Agrarian and connnercial interests were at the heart
of the expansion," Horsman correctly wrote, "but the new
accompanying racial ideology permeated these motives and
determined the nature of America's specific relationships
with other people they encountered in surge to world power."
Moreover, the need to justify unjust actions was particularly
pressing in a country which orofessed certain democratic
ideals. 5 9
Together with other doctrines, Anglo-Saxonism, as
ideology, was used to justify U.S. imperialism.
of American expansion," wrote Albert K.
motley body of justificatory doctrines.

The "ideology
"is its

It comprises
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metaphysi-cal·

of a providential mission and quasi-

scientific laws ·of national develo"pment, co"nceptions of
national right and ideals of social duty,

rationalizations

and appeals ·to the higher law, aims of extending freedom
and designs of eXtending benevolent absolutism." 60
Manifest Des.tiny, coined by the press in early 1848,
became the rallying cry of expansionists.

Its postulates

were outlined by Professor Frederick Merk: Anglo-Saxons
were endowed with innate superiority; Protestant Christianity
held the keys to heaven; only republican forms of political
organization were free; and the future--even the predestined
be hurried along by human hands, and the means
of hurrying it, if the end be good, need not be inquired
into too closely.

Anglo-Saxon nationalists believed "one

nation had a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty
mission, and consequently unique rights in the application
. . 1 es. .. 61
o f mora 1 pr1nc1p
Before the war against Mexico, U.S. policy limited
expansion to "unoccupied or sparsely settled areas."

U.S.

Representative Alexander Duncan, Ohio, articulated this
rationale:
The.re seems to be something in our
laws and institutions, peculiarly
adapted to our Anglo-Saxon American
race, under which they will thr.ive
and prosper, but under wnich all
others wilt and die. Where our laws
and free institutions have been:
extended among the Frerich and Spanish
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who have been on our continent, they
have and are. gradually disappearing;
not that they move ·awa'y, but they
neither prosper or
but on
the contrary dwindle.·
·
It was believed that "deniocratlc institutions functioned best
among a racially homogeneo"us. ·.. population."

Weinberg

correctly noted that "a supercilious theory of racial
inequality, had been current in the land of political
equalitarianism for years." 63
Florida, Louisiana and Texas were incorporated without
changing traditional U.S. national policy and without
justifying morally what was otherwise being acc·omplished.
The extension of "freedom" to areas with American pioneers
required no justification.

The "foreigners" (in their own

land) did not pose a problem or threat to national unity
or survival since they were few in number, hence they could
be rendered politically and economically powerless.
A few months after the outbreak of the War of 1846,
the U.S. cited the principle of territorial indemnity,
demanding Upper California.

Consistent with established

policy, there was no mention of amalgamation with
peoples."

All the U.S. wanted in early

1847, according

to U.S. Senator Lewis Cass, was "a portion of territory,
which they

nominally hold, generally uninhabited

or, where inhabi.ted at all, sparsely so, and with a
population that will soon r·ecede, or identify itself with ours. "

64
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New Mexico became the second territorial demand.

Like

California, New MeXico· was viewed as sparsely populated;
therefore, expansionists
policy.

saw no need to modify traditional

Moreover, American "pioneers" had already settled

in the Spanish-·Mexican northern province, thus satisfying
the second policy requirement.
As the war continued, however, the rhetoric of regeneration
became prevalent.

This became ·necessary because by the

winter and spring of 1847,
indemnity demands.

had increased the

They then said that the people, along

with the natural resources, ought to be "uplifted."
In order to secure the 'best possible t.rea ty, talk was
heard of occupying all of Mexico.

In late spring of 1847,

the Herald announced: "The universal Yankee nation can
regenerate and disenthrall the people of liexico in a few
years; and we believe it is a part of our destiny to civilize
that beautiful country and enable its inhabitants to appreciate
some of the many advantages and blessings we enjoy."

To

regenerate the masses of the people, but not the "evil and
corrupt" rulers, was the least a "Christian nation" could
do to redeem itself for usurping land.
This paternalistic viewpoint was eXpressed in a letter
published by the· wa·shing·ton D'aily Unlon: [It

"The

religious execution of our country's. glorious mission, under
the 'direction of Divine Providence·,' to ·civilize and Christianize
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and raise up· £rom anarchy and

a most ignorant,

indolent,· wicked and unhappy people. " 65
However, the sure ·possibility of conquering California
and New Mexico' militarily took away the temptation of
occupying, everi if temporarily, all of Mexico.

"In proposing

to acquire ·New Mexico and California it was known that but
an inconsiderable portion of the Mexican people would be
transferred with them." 66 At that point regeneration was
dropped as a justificatory motive.

Self-interest prevailed

and the conquest of land and its resources was unabashedly
revealed as the primary motive.

The people who came with

the territories would then face a dilemma.
But ·evidently to soothe their guilt, the "weaker
expansionists ·did not, like imperialists later on in the
same century, propose to assign to Mexico
of colonial dependency."

a permanent status

And Weinberg has concluded that

even though the U.S. eventually took only New Mexico and
California "in contrast with the

Philippine

situation

annexation could have been achieved with relatively little
opposition from the Mexican people; for although expansionists
invariably declare the ordinary people of the desired land to
be in favor of its conquerors, it so happened that in this
case they were largely right." 67
The hist-ory of Mexicanos in the ·conquered areas, however1
shows strong opposition to U.S. domination.

Whether these
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areas became colonial enclaves is open to debate.
In any case, U.S. policy makers recognized the obvious:
that Mexicans viewed Anglo-Saxonism and anti-Catholicism as
antithetical to their own institutions.

Gene Brack who

studied the relationship between Anglo-Saxonism, antiCatholic attitudes and expansionist policy, wrote that an
examination of Mexican newspapers indicated that Mexicans
were indeed troubled.

A Puebla newspaper, for example,

warned that if the U.S. acquired Mexican territory, the
"Catholic religion will [

disappear from Mexican soil. ,GS

And El Siglo said: "American politicians have declared
themselves in favor of exterminating the 'odious Spanish race'
along with their religion ...

Americans, the editor wrote,

"shared eccentric beliefs and professed the most contradictory
doctrines.

They could be terrorized by the predictions of

insecure religious fanatics, and they proclaimed liberty for
all and yet had virtually annihilated the Indian." 69
Mexicans believed something similar would happen to them
after the U.S. invasion.

For example, the Mexican minister

to North America during the Texas revolt said that the
"struggle to halt American expansion was a war of 'race, of
religion, of language and, of customs. '" 70 It seemed that the
U.S. posed a danger like that of the "English under Henry VIII,
the Irish under William and Quebec under Wolfe." 71
In conquering New Mexico, President Polk and Secretary
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of War W.L. Marcyl embarked on a pacification strategy,
1

pleading for the co'o,pera tion .of the D. S. · Catholic Church
leaders:
The ·great care ·Polk ·and Seri. Benton
took to prevent fighting was indicated
both 'by the orders to Kearny and by
the fact that the President invited
the ·catholic bishops uf New York and
St.· Louis to the White 'House to· ask
their advice about the bes·t means of
placating the priests in New MeXico.
Polk in particular was convinced--and
correctly so--that the priests occupied
such a dominant position in the lives
and government of all Mexico that
without their cooperation peaceful
conquest of the
not
possibly be acc·omplished.
Anti-Catholicism) however, had acquired deep roots;
therefore it could not be easily explained away.

Conflict

between Catholics and Protestants, evident around the turn
of the sixteenth century, was exacerbated by the Reformation.
At that time charges of corruption were levelled at the
Catholic Church, and the dogma and practices related to
the Mass, as well as the ·abuse of privileges, came under
serious attack.

The spiritual decline of the Church, real

or alleged, was only one aspect of the conflict, for basic
economic and political questions formed the core of the problem.
England was developing a national consciousness, vying
for international power; Spain, the leading Catholic nation)
was its main rival.
were synonymou·s·.

To the English, Catholicism and Spain

They believed the union of church and
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state. in Spain had produced the. ''Black
.-

... -

'

and the

Spanish ·rnquisi tion. · These were. ·vieW:ed with ranco.r.

"The

Roman pontiff loomed in English eyes as the ·great foreign
tyrant, menacing the nation and its constitution, his
followers had the aspect of a fifth column." 73
This tenacious anti-Catholic heritage was brought to
North America by English settlers, acquiring "a very real
local significance in the New World, for the English colonies
were wedged between two hostile Catholic empires, France
and Spain." 74 Many of the settlers were staunch Puritans,
the most zealous of those antagonistic to Catholicism, and
their hatred of Catholicism was kept alive by reading literature
from England.

Additionally, they developed their own anti-

Catholic propaganda.

During the colonial period Protestant

ministers denounced the Roman Church's moral and worldly
practices; the Inquisition was soundly condemned, and Spain
was characterized as "belligerent and possessed by Satan." 75
Later, "when Americans began actually to encounter Mexicans
in Texas, Santa Fe, and other MeXican territories, their
initial responses were conditioned primarily by the traditions
of h .

h o'b.

an d

.

cath o1. .

'' 7 6

Moreover, as

Cecil Robinson conunerited: "The first Americans to make contact
with the Mexican civilization of the Southwes·t were homogeneous
in their Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition in a way that
Americans have ·not been since.·

They approached Mexican
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Catholicism with a pre...:existing hostility .

John Higham

underscored the point in anothe·r context; yet :it is
applicable ·here.
For two principal reasons an
undercurrent Protestant nativism
persisted into the ·new democratic
America and revived in the second
quarter of the nineteenth century.
One reason lay in the character of
American institutions. Catholic
traditions continued to look
dangerously un-American partly
because they did not harmonize ·
easily with the concept of
individual freedom embedded in the
national culture. Americans regarded
political liberty as their chief
national attribute and supreme
achievement. Observing the
authoritarian organization of the
Catholic Church and its customary
association with feudal or monarchical
governments, they were tempted to view
American liberty and
popery
Early travelers and writers from the U.S. were products
of this anti-Catholic tradition.

"The earliest literary

references to Mexico mainly in journals of adventure,
exploration and trade," wrote Robinson, "show American
writers to have ·been in general accord with the ideology
of t h .

own

.

"79

Josiah Gregg, for example, was

appalled at· the lack of religious freedom and toleration,
which he considered contradict'ory to the "independent and
tolerant spirit" in the

·u.s.

Gregg believed priests had too much power and control;
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their "infallibility" was totally incomprehensible to him.
It was disgrac.eful, he wrote, that pr.ies.ts were 'held in
such high esteem.

The clergy were,' after all, guilty of

corruption; These cunning and.deceitful priests simply look
the other way when sins are committed--as long as exorbitant
fees for baptisms, marriage ceremonies and burials are
collected, he wrote.·
And Lieutenant Zebulon Pike believed the better informed
MeXican clergy would eventually declare for religious liberty
and "Mexican liberals would welcome help from the U.S. in
overthrowing the yoke of the oppressive Catholic Church." 80
Rufus Sage, a traveler passing through Taos in 1842,
condemned the priests for their tacit approval of superstitious
and idolatrous practices.

Furthermore, he said that

education was non-existent . . Sage's views were probably
typical of Anglo-Americans in the 1840s.
Two decades later, after the Civil War, Protestant
missionaries arrived in New Mexico, also viewing the territory
as a spiritual wilderness filled with Spanish-Mexican Catholics
and Anglo settlers crying out for the "pure light of the new
Christian gospel."

The missionaries were products of a

time when "Protestant

thinking held an integral prominent

part in the Anglo-Saxon American's expansionistic mentality,
providing moral and evangelical grounds for territorial
expansion and conquest." 81 Nationalistic missionaries declared
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that. the U.S. was the. great eva:ngelist
and .teacher
.of
.
.
democr·acy.

The·y believed the· idea of· :Manifes·t Des. tiny had

religious implications because it "signified. the triumph
of Protestantism over Catho'licism." 82

Concltisl·on
New Mexico remained a territory of the U.S. from 1850
until 1912.

According to Robert Larson, ''Nativism in

America ... was the major obstruction to the territory's
statehood aspirations." 83 In this vein, Lamar, comparing
New 11eX:ico to Puerto Rico and the Philippines, wrote that
these islands were "imperial possessions kept more for
strategic and economic reasons than for the purpose of
becoming states in the American Union."

Similarly, in

the first decade ·of the twentieth century, Theodore
Roosevelt and U.S. Senator Albert Beveridge, chairman of
the conunittee on territories, viewed New Mexico like they
did the new empire.

But, paradoxically, New Mexico did
become the forty-seventh state of the ·u.s. in 1912. 84
The social transformation which took place in New Mexico
from 1810 until 1910 profoundly affected all people.

Most

small farmers, land grant heirs, paisanos, and. the poor
generally responded to the changes rationally, courageously,
and in the 'process hec'ame participants in the making of their
own history.

But that story has yet to be ·written.
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Instead, historical literature reveals that interpretations
of chap.ge ·and conflict in New Mexico are not entirely
adequate.

Some historians, for example, explain that

conflict is an aberration, and they de-emphasize its role.
They "magnified the process of selective recollection,"
owing to a historic vision of themselves· as "latter-day
chosen people.· ... "

The study of conflict has been eschewed,

instead writers created and perpetuated the myth of
"tricultural harmony" to suit particular interests.
Furthermore, their work centers almost exclusively on
North American behavior, and their "optimistic parochialism"
has resulted in narrow explanations. 85
For example, one historian explained that ''The dynamic
and expansive force of Manifest Destiny made American
occupation of the Rio Grande area well-nigh inevitable."
Another historian wrote that when the United States Army
occupied New Mexico, "an old era ended and a new one began."
These "natural," "irreversible" and metaphysical laws have
been utilized to explain a complex social history. 86
Additionally, a subjective comparison of "cultures"
has been used to explain history.

According to one

historian, "The energetic and aggressive
civilization would now be grafted on the aged and somewhat
lethargic Spanish and Indian ones.n 87 Another historian
agreed: "Unlike the dynamic, individualistic, optimistic
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society Anglo-American pioneers

for themselves

in the Shenandoah and Ohio. Valleys: between 1760 and

1815, here was a stabilized, almost incestuous society
existing in nearly total iso1ation." 88 It has been assumed
that a nation populated with Anglo-Saxon Protestants
defeated a traditional,

civilization, comprised of

racial mixtures and of Roman Catholics.

And, as one

writer said: "In the long run, most of the residents of
the Territory--peasants, ricos, and clergy--accepted the
situation because it seemed inevitable and there was no
place else for most to go." 89 End of story.
These scholars anchor problems on simple and vaguely
defined "culture clashes" between a "traditional, folk
society and a modern, progressive one."

Using this aT?proach

historians explain that when the "cultures" met competition
followed, but that eventually there was accommodation and
assimilation.

Studies based on this inadequate framework

view conflict as a temporary obstacle 'in the otherwise
smooth evolution of history.
be difficult to deny.
transition.

That change took place would

It is simply seen as orderly

Utopian in nature, this view portrays a

harmonious world in which everyone has a place, accepts
it, and acts out a prescribed role.
affirmed and sustained.

The .status quo is

Writers who adhere to this

untenable ·design are· complacent, conservative and unimaginative.
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have

And,
mystified i.t. .· Their

contradictory, and .declarative

statements :res'ul t in foregone conclus·ions, and they have
not ·been fruitful in opening up serious discussion of key
historical questions.
More recently, the ·concept of "cultural pluralism"
been utilized to explain how people ·shduld be
"incorporated into a stable, hdmogeneous society."

One

response to "militant and radical activity" has been to
discard the melting pot theory which was employed to explain
the accommodation of white European immigrants.

Instead,

the concept of pluralism portrays the United States as a
multicultural society made up of diverse groups contributing
and benefitting equally.

Racism is acknowledged all too

however, the panacea is ·to encourage reforms that
will "reflect the interests of all."
In this vein, one historian noted that New Mexico
"came of age " in the last decades of the nineteenth
century and so it came to pass in the grand design that
"cultural pluralism," or the best of all possible worlds,
became a reality in American New Mexico.

When New Mexico,

after sixty-four years, was finally admitted into the
Union, a masterful compromise was worked out to everyone's
satisfaction.

The Spanish-Mexican culture had survived

the nineteenth ·century.

Al·though "Spanish--Americans"
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may have "surrendered
politically,u the idea
.of the patron
.
.
.
in a caste sys·teni reniai.ned strong. ·Public, .non-se:ctarian
schools were es:tablished, but the 'Mexicans kept their
Catholicfsm and their archaic language; their simple folk
culture and subsistence ·economy persisted in spite of the
rise ·of industrial capitalism.

A distinct, unique, folk

group in a charming and pictures·que region now could
appreciate the conquest that began in 1846: "An invisible
frontier of misunderstanding had at last begun to disappear."
And to this day all residents of New Mexico use Amigo
bank cards, enjoy tamale bashes and Spanish fiestas where
Mexican mariachis play "Spanish" music.

At least once per

year in the "Land of Enchantment" chambers of commerce of
all stripes light luminarias and sing "De Colores" and
the pepsi generation songs--all in harmony and brotherhood .
. Frequently

however, events in the twentieth century

illustrate that conflict -. continues to be prevalent_._
Racial, political, and class struggles have continued since

1912.

For example, labor conflict, land grant battles,

police violence, and, just recently, the Santa Fe prison
riot--one of the most lethal penitentiary uprisings in the
history of penal

that conflict is

still a fact of life.
Studies .of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
which ·extend beyond simple ·explanations ·for conflict must
be woven within a clear analysis of social change.

The

90
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series of violent episodes in the
ninetee.nth century,
.
.
for example,·

PlUS t

be· ·related to larger economic and

political pr.oce·sses and to race and class relationships.
The ·complex social relationships ·between people, who,
after all, were ·the ·sources of conflict, partly account
for the difficulty in writing a more complete social
history.
One central guiding principle could be the function
of U.S. law: Its relationship to land grants, to criminal
justice, to class control, and as a mediating force.
Studies based on clear formulations of these and related
problems will prove the most useful toward a deeper
understanding of New Mexico's social history.
This is the challenge that awaits those who are motivated
to tell the best story possible about the ·paisanos and
the "inarticulate."
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